On May 9, 2025, the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs (HIIA) held a roundtable discussion titled, “Georgia’s place in Europe and Eurasia” in Hungarian. The panelists included András László, Member of the European Parliament and Government Commissioner, Revaz Gachechiladze, Professor at the Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University, and Péter Pál Kránitz, Senior Research Fellow at the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs. The discussion was moderated by HIIA Senior Research Fellow Sándor Seremet.
Revaz Gachechiladze began the discussion by noting Georgia’s location at the border of Europe and Asia. Georgians have always felt closer to Europe, especially after gaining independence in 1918. Even during the time of the Soviet Union, Georgia was seen as different from the rest. Most people in Georgia want to be part of Europe, and the country will eventually be a European country, even if not in the next decade given the current tense relations.
András László turned the discussion to EU-Georgia relations, which he suggested are not in the hands of Georgia. He highlighted that the war in Ukraine is blessing in that it is now possible to talk about the accession of new members again, but it’s a curse in that the expectation is that Georgia gets fully in line with the “foreign policy” of the European Union, even though foreign policy is supposed to be an area of national competence. The EU has been pushy towards Georgia, Hungary, and others in recent years without any strategic vision for how to face current geopolitical realities, which creates a lot of uncertainty. Its approach is ideological and not interests-based, which we need to move beyond.
Péter Pál Kránitz reflected on the EU approach to Georgia. European leaders used to support its EU accession, and at the NATO Summit in 2008, they declared that Georgia will indeed become a NATO member. What’s changed since then? Notably, Georgia has refused to participate in many of the EU’s initiatives—for example, it did not impose sanctions on Russia following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, even though it did help the EU uphold its sanctions. Russia is Georgia’s largest neighbor and a nuclear power with which it has had some tense relations in the past, so it is not in its interest to cause an escalation in tensions. At the same time, though, the Georgian Dream government is not “pro-Russian”—there are no diplomatic relations between it and the Russian government, and compromise with Russia (e.g. on the issue of Abkhazia) is a red line. This is why it will not join the BRICS or similar organizations, for instance, since that would mean compromise.
Both he and Revaz Gachechiladze noted that the change in relations with the West was also driven by the cultural revolution led by former U.S. President Joe Biden, who pursued a foreign policy explicitly pushing neoliberal values. Georgia is the most conservative society in the Christian world and cherishes traditional values, so this change in approach was not appreciated. While it wants to expand its relations, it does not want others to impose their own ideologies on it. András László noted that foreign interference is always about “civic engagement” and questioned reliability of the reports by the so-called “election observers.” While real civil society organizations are important, there needs to be proper checks in place to make sure that these are not simply tools of foreign influence.